In eSkeptic, David Sloan Wilson argues in favor of group selection and against Richard Dawkins, who scorns group selection in favor of the gene’s eye view.
Not only can group selection be a significant evolutionary force, it can sometimes even be the dominating evolutionary force. One of the most important advances in evolutionary biology is a concept called major transitions. It turns out that evolution takes place not only by small mutational change, but also by social groups and multi-species communities becoming so integrated that they become higher-level organisms in their own right. The cell biologist Lynn Margulis proposed this concept in the 1970s to explain the evolution of nucleated cells as symbiotic communities of bacterial cells. The concept was then generalized to explain other major transitions, from the origin of life as communities of cooperating molecular reactions, to multi-cellular organisms and social insect colonies.
Of course, for religion to be favored by group selection, there would have to be some positive aspects to religion, which Dawkins is loath to acknowledge.
One of my projects is a collaboration with the psychologist Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi (pronounced shick-sent-me-hi), who is best known
among general readers for his books on peak psychological
experience, such as Flow and The Evolving Self. Csikszentmihalyi
pioneered the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) which involves
signaling people at random times during the day, prompting them to
record their external and internal experience — where they are, who
they are with, what they are doing, and what they are thinking and
feeling on a checklist of numerical scales. The ESM is like an
invisible observer, following people around as they go about their
daily lives. It is as close as psychological research gets to the
careful field studies that evolutionary biologists are accustomed to
performing on non-human species, which is why I teamed up with
Csikszentmihalyi to analyze some of his past studies from an
evolutionary perspective.
These studies were performed on such a massive scale and with so
much background information that we can compare the psychological
experience of religious believers vs. nonbelievers on a
moment-by-moment basis. We can even compare members of conservative
vs. liberal protestant denominations, when they are alone vs. in the
company of other people. On average, religious believers are more
prosocial than non-believers, feel better about themselves, use
their time more constructively, and engage in long-term planning
rather than gratifying their impulsive desires. On a
moment-by-moment basis, they report being more happy, active,
sociable, involved and excited. Some of these differences remain
even when religious and non-religious believers are matched for
their degree of prosociality. More fine-grained comparisons reveal
fascinating differences between liberal vs. conservative protestant
denominations, with more anxiety among the liberals and
conservatives feeling better in the company of others than when alone.
One group advantage fundamentalists have is the set of rules that everyone follows leads them to align efforts toward the same goal. Individualism often means that people work at cross-purposes. On the other hand, individualism may be more robust, because it is more easily adaptable to differing circumstances.
Fundamentalism religion can last for many generations, which suggests it is well-adapted. It could be that when religions start–as cults centered on a prophet–they are quite fragile, and most cults to not survive. The ones that are passed on from generation to generation have passed through a sieve of selection.
Update: Richard Dawkins replies
The central theme of the book is the question of whether God exists. I agree that it is also interesting to ask whether religion has some kind of Darwinian survival value. But whatever the answer to that might turn out to be, it will make no difference to the central question of whether God exists. Religious belief might have a positive survival value and God might or might not exist. Religious belief might have a negative survival value and God might or might not exist. Moreover, other important aspects of my critique, dealt with in other chapters of The God Delusion, are also unaffected by religion’s possible evolutionary advantages.
As for group selection (either as normally understood or in the idiosyncratic sense of Wilson’s private re-definition, about which he has been obsessing for thirty years), The God Delusion devotes a sympathetic page and half to the possibility that something like it might apply to the special case of religion.